首頁 / 雜誌 / 組織與管理 / 202108 (14:2期) / 家族繼任CEO股權融資併購前之資訊揭露策略
中文篇名

家族繼任CEO股權融資併購前之資訊揭露策略

英文篇名

Disclosures Strategy of Family Succession CEOs Prior to Stock-financed M&As

作者

翁鶯娟楊敏里

中文摘要

本研究延伸現有社會情感財富觀點文獻,探討家族繼任CEO如何影響股權融資併購前意圖釋放好消息的資訊揭露策略,以補充現有家族企業與併購之相關文獻。本研究進一步納入家族涉入高階團隊和股權程度以及公司績效缺口,討論為何不同之家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息的意圖具有差異性。研究結果發現家族繼任CEO於股權融資併購前傾向釋放好消息,而且當家族涉入程度愈高與公司績效低於預期水準愈大時,家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息的意圖愈強。此外,本研究亦發現家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息,正向影響併購後之公司績效,隱含家族繼任CEO釋放好消息的目的為降低資訊不對稱問題而非為攫取私人利益。

英文摘要

This study extends the extant literature on family socioemotional wealth to complement the research regarding family businesses and M&As by discussing why the family succession CEOs manage disclosures through the release of good news before stock-financed M&As. Meanwhile, we incorporate family involvement in top management teams and ownership, as well as a firm’s performance aspiration gap, to further illustrate why the intentions of disclosure management are heterogeneous among family successors.

The results show that a family succession CEO is more likely to release good news prior to stock-financed M&As. We also found that family involvement and a firm’s performance below the aspiration level enhance the family successors’ intention regarding disclosure management. Moreover, family successors who release good news generate better post-M&A performance, implying that the intention of family succession CEOs to manage disclosures is more likely to reduce information asymmetry rather than solely pursue self-interest.

關鍵詞

資訊揭露管理家族涉入家族繼任CEO績效預期缺口社會情感財富disclosure managementfamily involvementfamily succession CEOperformance aspiration gapsocioemotional wealth

刊名

組織與管理

期數

202108 (14:2期)

起訖頁

023-070

出版單位

臺灣組織與管理學會

DOI

10.3966/199687602021081402003  複製DOI   DOI查詢

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社會學與臺灣的家族企業研究

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家族認同、家族股權控制及家族跨代接班與現金儲備之關聯性